This paper investigates the impact of spatial zoning restrictions on retail market outcomes. We estimate a structural model of entry, location and format choice across a large number of markets in the presence of zoning restrictions. The paper contributes to the literature in three ways: First, the paper demonstrates that estimates of factors affecting market potential and competitive intensity in the extant literature on entry and location choice that do not account for zoning restrictions are significantly biased. Second, the cross-market variations in zoning regulations helps us test and provide evidence for the theory that constraints on spatial differentiation will lead to greater product differentiation. Finally, we provide qualitative insight on how zoning impacts retail entry and format variety; in particular we evaluate the impact of prototypical zoning arrangements such as "centralized," "neighborhood," and "outskirt" zoning on entry and format variety.
Introduction
Zoning is a device for land use planning used by local governments, and refers to the practice of designating permitted uses of land based on mapped zones within their jurisdictions which separate one set of land uses from another. Broadly, land is zoned for residential, industrial, commercial, agricultural, forests, open spaces and recreational purposes among others. Typically there are also finer regulations on the types of residences, industries and commercial ventures that are allowed on particular parcels of land. The practice of zoning in modern days began in the 1860's in Germany (Ladd 1990) , and was widely embraced in the United States during the 1920's, with New York City passing its first zoning ordinance in 1916 (Fischel 2004) . While there has been much research, discussions and debate in the urban planning literature about the motivations and effects of residential zoning (see Chung (1994) and Pogodzinski (1991) for reviews), there has been limited research on how zoning impacts market outcomes. For example, how do changes in zoning impact retailer entry and choice of formats due to their impact on retail competition and profits in equilibrium?
The paper estimates a static, structural simultaneous move game of endogenous entry, location and format choice across a large number of markets within the United States, taking into account the various local zoning restrictions on commercial entry. We use our analysis to help answer substantive, econometric and theoretical questions of interest related to spatial zoning. First, the paper introduces the zoning dimension to the by-now extensive literature on entry (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991; Mazzeo, 2002; Vitorino, 2010; Zhu, Singh and Manuszak, 2009; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009) , and location choice (e.g., Seim, 2006; Orhun, 2005; Watson, 2009; . Having access to zoning data helps us answer an econometric question with important substantive implications. Specifically, does the omission of zoning restrictions in the extant literature on entry and location choice bias estimates of factors affecting market potential and competitive intensity and if so, by how much? It is easy to see how the omission of zoning can lead to biased inferences on demand side factors such as population and income that impact retailer profits. In the absence of zoning, the absence of stores in locations with high population and income should imply that populations and income do not have a big impact on profits, while if we recognize that the lack of entry is because zoning prevents entry into these residential locations, these factors will indeed have a large positive impact on store profits. Omitted zoning regulations also will bias estimates of competitive intensity because one may again partly explain absence of stores in certain locations to competitive effects, when in reality the location may not be available for entry due to zoning restrictions. The bias in estimates is not merely an econometric issue; given the difficulties associated with assembling zoning data, understanding the magnitude of the bias due to the omission of zoning restrictions can be valuable in guiding whether policy makers, firms and researchers need to invest in collecting zoning data in making decisions or recommendations.
Second, the paper contributes to the theoretical literature on the link between spatial and product differentiation. Theory predicts that constraints on spatial differentiation will lead to greater product differentiation; for example, in the context of the Internet, Kuksov (2004) conjectured that firms will respond to the inability to spatially differentiate on the Internet with greater product differentiation. Bar-Isaac et al., (2009) elaborate on this argument of endogenous differentiation to explain the long-tail effect of greater product variety in Internet retail environments. However the theory has not faced empirical scrutiny. As zoning restrictions affect the ability of retailers to spatially differentiate, we exploit cross-market variations in spatial zoning restrictions for retailers to empirically test the validity of the theoretical prediction. Specifically, we test whether tighter zoning restrictions lead to greater format variety. In the context of retailing, if zoning prevents spatial differentiation, retailers will differentiate more on retail formats. For example, in food retailing, retailers can offer many formats: supermarkets, supercenters, convenience stores, mass-merchandising etc. Hence, if theory were true, tighter zoning will increase format variety without necessarily reducing the number of stores.
Finally, it provides substantive insight for citizens and local regulators who decide on zoning regulations, and firms who have to assess the equilibrium impact of zoning regulations.
We use the estimates of the structural model to perform counterfactual simulations on how zoning regulations impacts entry, location and format choice. Specifically, we assess how certain "prototype" zoning approaches such as "centralized," "neighborhood" or "outskirt" zoning affect retail entry and retail format mix.
The paper leverages on a method introduced in Datta and Sudhir (2012) to obtain zoning data from a publicly available digital dataset called National Land Cover Dataset (NLCD). In spite of the importance of zoning in retail entry and location decisions, extant research has ignored the issue primarily because of the lack of easily available zoning data across a large number of markets. We use NLCD in conjunction with Geographic Information System tools such as ArcGIS and Google Earth to recover zoning data in any number of markets across the entire U.S.
We use maximum likelihood estimation for estimation of the static discrete game. 1 1 Alternatives to likelihood based approaches include method of moments (Thomadsen 2005; Draganska et al., 2009) , minimum distance or asymptotic least square estimators (Pakes et al., 2007; Bajari et al., 2007; Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler 2008) and maximum score estimators (Fox and Bajari 2010; Fox 2007; Ellickson et al., 2010) . Some well-known methodological challenges in estimating discrete games include the possibility of multiple equilibria in the model, multiple equilibria in the data, and slow convergence or potential non-convergence of the MLE estimation algorithm. We use recent innovations in the literature to address these issues. We use the nested pseudo likelihood (NPL) approach to address the equilibrium selection challenge in the face of multiple equilibria in the model by selecting the equilibrium most consistent with the conditional choice probabilities (CCP) in the data. To address the challenge of equilibrium selection in the presence of multiple equilibria in the data, we combine a "parallel NPL" procedure, which intuitively involves starting from different starting values of CCP with a genetic algorithm approach which ensures we search over a large space of equilibria as suggested by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2005) . Finally, to speed convergence, we use a transformed contraction mapping suggested by Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008) .
Besides the literature on entry and location games, there is a nascent and contemporaneous empirical literature that has begun to explore the relationships between market structure and zoning or land use regulations. Suzuki (2010) and Nishida (2010) study the endogenous market entry decisions of firms, controlling for market level land use regulations that involve additional investment or time on behalf of a firm in order to obtain the permission to enter a market. 2 Our key findings are as follows: First, we find significant biases in the estimates for factors affecting market potential and competitive intensity when zoning is not accounted for.
Therefore future empirical work on entry and location choice needs to incorporate zoning restrictions in their analysis. Second, zoning restrictions do reduce entry, but over small ranges of restrictions, firms respond by increasing format variety without reducing entry. This suggests that if one does not take into account format responses, one might see weak linkages Not surprisingly, they find that such land use regulations can be anti-competitive by acting as a barrier for entry through higher entry costs. Ridley et al., (2010) use zoning data for 15 municipalities in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area to study how zoning impacts the number of rivals, prices of the central retailer and the average distance from rivals.
Through reduced form regressions, they show that in the geographical area around a central retailer, the fraction of area that is zoned for commercial use has a positive correlation with the number of rivals, the prices of the central retailer, and its average distance from rivals. In sum their results support the hypothesis that tighter commercial zoning leads to fewer rivals, but still overall a firm faces more price competition because of zoning-forced spatial proximity.
None of these papers tackle the issue of format variety, which can moderate the effects on entry and competition.
2 Suzuki (2010) uses seven indices to measure the stringency of land use (zoning) regulations in 60 Texas counties to study the entry decisions of mid-scale chain hotels in those counties. Nishida (2010) studies the entry decisions of convenience store chains in Okinawa, Japan. In his application, an entire market is counted as a zoned market if retailers are required to obtain development permission from the government in order to enter the market. between zoning restrictions and entry and potentially conclude that zoning has limited impact on retail entry decisions. Substantively, we find that different prototypical arrangements like centralized, neighborhood and outskirt zoning can lead to different retail structures in terms of both the number and type of stores in a market. Outskirt zoning leads to more homogeneous formats, while centralized zoning leads to more format variety. Finally, we demonstrate empirical evidence to the theoretical conjectures that firms indeed respond to tightened spatial differentiation (or inability to spatially differentiate) through greater product (in our case format) differentiation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model and estimation strategy. Section 3 describes the entry and location choice data and our approach to obtaining spatial zoning data. Section 4 discusses the potential sources of estimation bias followed by a discussion of the estimates of the model and Section 5 presents the results of counterfactual simulations. Section 6 concludes with a brief summary of the findings and the limitations of this research.
Model and Estimation Strategy

Model of Strategic Entry, Location and Store Format Choice
We model the entry, location and store format choice as a two-stage game in which the firms first make entry decisions and then the location and format choices. More precisely, in the first stage, each firm, i decides whether or not to enter a market m (m = 1, 2,…, M); subsequently, in the second stage the entering firms simultaneously choose their respective store type or format, f (f = 1,2,…, F), and store location within the market.
For the purposes of illustration, imagine a square city with a grid of L m discrete blocks or 'locations' (Figure 1(a) ). Firm i's payoff at each location, l (l = 1, 2,…, L m ), is modeled as a function of the endogenous choice of format type, f, the market characteristics at the location, xl, the actions (entry, location and format choices) of all firms, a = (ai, a-i), and an idiosyncratic profit shock, ifl ε , which is the firm's private information and is known to rivals (and the researcher) only in distribution:
In this incomplete information setup, a firm cannot exactly predict rivals' actions but it has rational beliefs about their strategies. For example, suppose firms are homogeneous, then each firm will make its decision based on its belief about the number of firms that would enter the market, m N , and its belief that an entering rival will choose a particular location as represented by a vector of conditional location choice probabilities (CCP),
For instance, the firm may have a belief that a rival, conditional on entry, will choose location 'j' with probability . Hence, for homogeneous firms the expected profit at location l can be written as (after dropping subscript 'f' for format):
In extant models, firms are allowed to consider all L m locations in the market so that each location has some positive probability of being chosen by a firm. However, since firms are not allowed to set up stores in residential locations, we use our zoning data to exclude such locations and concentrate only on a subset of potential retail locations, l = {1, 2,…, lm} (Figure 1(b) ).
Hence, retailers' ability to differentiate spatially, and the level of consumers' search cost, is driven by the lm zoned locations.
Like Seim (2006) , we divide the area around a location into concentric circles or distance bands. All consumers on a distance band b (b = 1, 2,…, B) around location l are assumed to have the same effect on the firm's profit. Also, all rivals of a particular format type that are on distance band b are assumed to have the same competitive effect on the firm. Hence, Equation
(1) can be expanded as follows:
where, lb x is a vector of location characteristics like population and per capita income in distance band b around location l. The impact of these location characteristics ( fb α ) on profits is allowed to be format-specific as denoted by the subscript 'f'. The second term on the right hand side of Equation (3) 
β − to reflect that intraformat competition will be lower than inter-format competition, reflecting the benefit of format differentiation on firm profit. Finally, m ξ captures the unobserved attractiveness of the market that cannot be explained by the observable market characteristics. It would include market characteristics that are unobserved by the researcher but that are common knowledge for firms when they make their decision. 3 Firms have rational expectations about rivals' strategies in equilibrium so that firm i expects a particular number of f-format (f'-format) rivals in distance band b,
Hence, the firm can form expectations about its profit at each location as follows: 
Hence, for each market, we essentially have a matrix of lm X F conditional format and location choice probabilities (conditional on m N firms entering the market),
Now, analogous to Equation (2), we can rewrite Equation (4a) 
Next, we normalize the profit from not entering a market to zero so that the entry probability for a firm is given by the nested logit form:
Hence, if there are, say, R potential retail entrants then the expected total number of entrants in market m is given by:
By exogenously fixing R, and by observing the actual number of entrants, m N , the unobserved market attractiveness parameter, m ξ , can be estimated using Equations (7) and (8):
We assume that m ξ is i.i.d. across markets, and follows a normal distribution,
Thus the probability that a total of The constraint in Equation (10) is a system of equations that defines firms' conditional location choice probabilities as the fixed point of a continuous mapping between firms' strategies and their rivals' strategies. As the conditional location choice probabilities in a market must add up to 1, by Brouwer's fixed point theorem, this system of equations has at least one solution or fixed point, * P Θ , for any value of Θ . 4
Estimation Strategy
Simplifying Restrictions
In the general model specification above, the number of model parameters increases exponentially with the number of format types (F) due to the inter-format and intra-format competition effects. The number of distance bands (B) around each location further explodes the number of parameters. Specifically, in our empirical application, we have six format types (F = 6), and we consider five 1-mile width distance bands around each location (B = 5). Therefore, the number of competition parameters alone is 180 (F 2 *B = 6*6*5). Given that we only have 100 sample markets (M) from which to estimate the model, we employ two restrictions to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated.
First, we assume that the competition effect between a pair of rival formats is symmetric.
That is, for any distance band, b, and for two rivals with formats f and f', we assume
Second, we assume a constant multiplier assumption on the effects across distance bands. Specifically, we assume that the impact of a factor on market potential at a particular distance band to be a constant multiplier of the impact of that factor in the first 0-1 mile distance band. 5
fb α
For instance, suppose the coefficients of population and per-capita income on store profit are denoted by and 2 fb α , respectively; then the restriction implies: 
Similarly for competition, we assume that:
Multiple Equilibria in the Model
Estimation involves finding the equilibrium solution, ( )
, which is the global optimum of Equation (10) where, * MLE P is the corresponding Conditional (format and location)
Choice Probabilities (CCPs), and
the Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE). Using a nested fixed-point (NFXP) approach for estimation is computationally demanding as it involves
solving for the fixed-point of Equation (6) at each step of the likelihood maximization. More importantly, if there are multiple equilibria in the model then the NFXP approach may only find one of the equilibria as it is not well adapted to finding all equilibria. Specifically, for a value of θ , if Equation (6) has multiple solutions for CCPs then the likelihood is not well defined.
One approach to address the equilibrium selection problem in the presence of multiple equilibria in the model is the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) approach developed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) . The standard NPL approach starts with an initial guess of the CCPs, and converges to an equilibrium solution in the limit. For example, in our case, we would start with initial guess values for firms' beliefs about rivals' CCPs, 0 P . Then, using Equations (6) through (10) we would obtain the likelihood, ( ) 0 , L P Θ . Maximizing the likelihood would give the parameter estimates, 1 Θ , and new CCPs, 1 P . This would constitute one iteration and the new CCPs would be used for firms' beliefs about rivals' actions in the next iteration. The n th iteration of the standard NPL approach can be denoted by the following contraction mapping:
With multiple iterations, if there is convergence, the contraction mapping would converge to an equilibrium solution or a NPL fixed point, ( )
Multiple Equilibria in the Data
The NPL approach however is not well-suited to select the right equilibrium if there are multiple equilibria in the data; then the contraction mapping in Equation (12) 
. However, it does not guarantee that this set will contain the global optimum, ( )
For a more efficient search of the global optimum, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2005) propose combining the parallel-NPL with a Genetic Algorithm (GA). GA is a search heuristic that mimics natural evolution processes such as 'selection', 'crossover' or 'reproduction' and 'mutation', and can be used to obtain the global optimum of complex optimization problems.
Combining the parallel-NPL with GA has two advantages -(1) It spreads the search for the global optimum over a much wider range of the contraction mapping than what is feasible with just the parallel-NPL, and (2) The GA steers the tracks of the parallel-NPL iterations towards those regions of the contraction mapping that are more likely to contain the global optimum. 6
Convergence
The algorithm may not converge to the global optimum if the contraction mapping does not have good local convergence properties around the global optimum. Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008) recommend transforming the mapping by replacing ( ) , P Ψ Θ with the following log-linear combination of ( )
Note that ( )
Θ have the same fixed-point solution(s). An appropriate value of δ can modify the concavity or convexity of the mapping such that the transformed mapping is Locally Contractive around the fixed point and will converge even if the original mapping does not. 7 Finally, even when the mapping does converge, the rate of convergence could be extremely slow and may require a large number of iterations. To avoid this, Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008) propose the following q-stage operator called q-NPL:
Again, ( )
Θ also has the locally contractive property of ( ) , P Λ Θ . Hence, in our estimation, we replace the standard NPL operator, Ψ , with the Locally Contractive, q-NPL operator, q Λ . The resulting parallel NPL iterations are then combined with GA as described also relies on multiple runs with different starting values to find different equilibria. Hence, its ability to find the global optimum in problems that have a large action space (as in our entry and location choice problem) is unclear.
7 Essentially, this means that the value of δ should be such that the eigen values of above. This procedure searches efficiently over the space of possible equilibria and converges fast to a set of equilibria which almost certainly contains the global optimum. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical application of this procedure to speed convergence. Details of the sequence of steps involved in estimation are provided in Appendix A.
Data
Sample Markets
An empirical analysis of firms' strategic entry, location and format decisions requires an appropriate choice of markets. A market must be large enough to not only accommodate multiple competing firms of different formats, but also for the possibility of spatial differentiation among the entering firms. Yet, there is little value in studying spatial competition in too large a spatial market where firms would locate far away from each other (for grocery stores spatial competition falls off rapidly beyond 3 miles). In our application for big-box grocery retailers, extremely small towns and villages or large areas such as Census Metropolitan Statistical Areas are therefore not useful to be defined as a market. Further, towns and cities with very high population tend to have very complex zoning regulations such as subdivision zoning which cannot be inferred from our zoning data. Also, these large and dense markets usually have multiple stores of a retail chain requiring us to identify individual retailers and distinguish cannibalization effects from competition effects. Finally, clusters of towns, and suburbs of large cities like Chicago make it difficult to define a market boundary that reasonably separates retailers and consumers within a geographical area, where the market is self-contained, in being able to clearly define who are the consumers 'inside' a market and who are rivals 'outside' the market.
Given these challenges, we employ the following two criteria in selecting markets for analysis: (1) Single towns and town pairs with populations ranging from 20,000 -250,000
people; (2) isolated markets that do not have another city or town within a 10 mile radius. Based on these criteria, we selected a set of 100 markets (i.e., M = 100) across several U.S. states. 8 Figure 2 shows the spread of markets in our sample across the entire U.S. Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for our sample markets.
Consumers, Grocery Retailers, and their Locations
Our Table 2 provides a description of these store formats.
For the location choice game, we divide a market into a uniform grid of discrete 1 sq.
mile blocks or market locations. Our 100 sample markets have a total of 7,216 such locations. But zoning regulations dictate which of these locations are available for big-box retailers. Below, we discuss our approach for identifying these retail locations and their commercial centers. Just as consumers are placed at the population-weighted center of CBGs, we place retailers within a retail location at the commercial center of the location.
Our concept of market locations differs from the standard approach in earlier research that treats census divisions as market locations and places retail stores at the populationweighted center along with consumers. The standard approach simplifies the data setup process but it has severe drawbacks: (1) The population-weighted center of a census division is likely to be a residential zone so that placing retail stores there would confound the inclusion of zoning regulations; (2) Stores are rarely present in the interior of a census division, rather, they are present on roads that border these census divisions; (3) Census divisions vary extensively in size so that, for large census divisions, stores may be located quite far from the center. In contrast, our approach allows us to incorporate spatial zoning, and it avoids major distortions of the distances between competitors and the distances of stores from population centers. Note that we use Great Circle distance as the distance between any two points.
We next describe the National Land Cover Dataset (NLCD) and discuss how it is used in conjunction with Geographical Information System tools such as ArcGIS and Google Earth to recover the potential retail locations and their commercial centers.
Spatial Zoning Data
Multi-Resolution Land Characteristics Consortium, a conglomerate of several federal agencies, has created two NLCD datasets that provide consistent and accurate digital landcover information for the coterminous U.S. The first national land-cover mapping project, Step 1: Constructing Market Boundaries and Market Locations:
Interestingly, the land type classifications include residential and commercial land. Residential land is further classified into low and high intensity residential land, and commercial land comprises of highly developed areas that do not include residential areas. We use the NLCD data in the following three steps to identify the potential retail locations.
We use the data in NLCD 2001 to construct the market boundaries of our sample markets. The residential and commercial land area pixel points in each market are projected on a map by using the ArcGIS software. This gives us the spatial area of interest for a market. A simple visual inspection of the pixel density is used to construct the market boundaries where the pixels fade away (See Figure 3(a) ). As our sample markets are reasonably isolated from other towns and cities, we can be flexible in choosing the shape of their boundaries. A rectangular shape is preferred so that a market can be easily divided into a uniform grid of discrete blocks or market locations. Thus, we construct imaginary rectangular borders (L miles X H miles where L and H are integers that vary across markets) around the residential and commercial pixel points of each market and then divide the market, specifically, into 1 sq. mile locations (See Figure 3(b) ).
Step 2: Commercial Activity and Commercial Center in a Location:
The extent of commercial activity in a location (as defined above) could affect firms' profit in the location if consumers have a preference for multi-purpose shopping or one-stop shopping. For instance, when shopping for groceries, consumers may like to combine their shopping trip with non-grocery purchases such as clothing and electronics so that locations with more retail businesses may be more attractive to firms. We isolate the NLCD 2001 pixel points that correspond to commercial land with retail businesses (See Appendix B for more details) and use the number of pixel points in a location as a measure for the extent of commercial activity in that location. The mean of the latitudes and longitudes of the commercial land pixel points in a location gives us the commercial center of the location (See Figure 3(c) ). We place all retail stores within a location at the commercial center of that location. We prefer the commercial center to the geographical center for the placement of retail stores also because the commercial center is likely to coincide with unobservables such as the positions of major road intersections within the 1 square mile block locations.
Step 3: Discerning Potential Retail Locations from other Commercial Locations:
The market locations that contain the commercial land pixel points are the commercial locations and they constitute a very small share of all market locations. Figure 3(d) ). We manually combed through the commercial locations, and specifically checked for the presence of major retail stores, major grocery stores and shopping centers to identify the commercial locations that have at least one big-box store.
Now, the absence of any type of big-box store in a commercial location does not necessarily imply that such stores are not allowed in that location. In particular, a commercial
location that is open to big-box stores may not have any such store if it is in an unfavorable or poor neighborhood and cannot support a big store. As we do not have a precise method for identifying such locations, we use the following heuristic. For each market, we find the minimum value of the total income of consumers within a 2-mile radius of the commercial locations that have big-box stores. 10
≤
We use this minimum as a benchmark for a commercial location in the market to be attractive enough to support at least one big-box retail store. That is, if a commercial location does not have any big-box store and the total income of consumers within a 2-mile radius of the location is less than the market benchmark, then we presume that the absence of a big-box store is due to the unattractiveness of the location and not necessarily because of zoning restrictions. Hence, a commercial location with no big-box store is still treated as a potential retail location when the following condition is satisfied:
11
To summarize, we use the NLCD data to construct market boundaries so that each market can be divided into a grid of 1 sq. mile locations. Then the commercial land pixel points 10 Our results are robust to using radii of 1, 2 and 3 miles. 11 This procedure may exclude some locations in high-income neighborhoods that are above the income benchmark, but are actually available for big-box retailers. To the extent, our criterion checks for any type of big-box store (grocery or non-grocery stores), such errors are likely infrequent, with little impact on estimates. The procedure may also include locations in low-income neighborhoods that are below the income benchmark even though in reality bigbox stores are not allowed in such locations. Such erroneous inclusion of low population or low per capita income locations would cause overestimation of the positive profit impact of these variables.
Income in 2-mile radius of a commercial location that has no big-box store Income in 2-mile radius of a commercial min location that has a big-box store
are used to obtain the extent of commercial activity in a location and also to locate the commercial center of the location. Extant models that do not account for zoning, assume that firms are allowed to set up stores in any market location. In contrast, we account for residential zoning by excluding locations that do not have any commercial land pixel points. Finally, we account for zoning regulations particularly against big-box retailers, within commercial locations, by defining potential retail locations as those commercial locations that (1) have at least one big-box store which is either a grocery or a non-grocery store, and (2) do not have a big-box store and are in a poor neighborhood which is below the market benchmark as described above.
Results
We first describe a descriptive analysis of the data before reporting the results of the structural model estimation.
Descriptive Analysis
The descriptive analysis has two objectives. First, we test for empirical evidence in support of the theoretical conjectures about how tightened spatial restrictions impact retail entry and format variety without any model restrictions. Second, we estimate the correlations between zoning restrictions and factors affecting market potential and competitive intensity to obtain guidance on the expected magnitude and direction of the potential bias from omitting zoning restrictions.
The link between spatial and format differentiation
We report the relationship between zoning restrictions and the number of competing stores in the 5 mi. radius of a given big-box grocery store in Collectively, these results demonstrate that zoning restrictions do negatively impact retail entry and format concentration. Further, given an available area for entry, and controlling for the number of entrants, tightening zoning restrictions that prevent firms to spatially differentiate (i.e., Prop in 3mi.), causes greater format differentiation and variety. Overall, the results support the theory that firms will respond to the inability to spatially differentiate through product (format) differentiation. Given this descriptive evidence, we will further explore the predictive implications of zoning restrictions for entry and format variety through counterfactual simulations based on estimates from a structural model of entry, location and format choice.
Potential Biases due to Omission of Zoning
We next discuss our expectations about the type of biases due omission of zoning restrictions. We report the histogram of the point-biserial correlation between zoning restrictions and demographic variables such as population and per-capita income for the 100 sample markets in Figure 4 . The figure indicates that there is substantial heterogeneity in the correlations. In the aggregate, the mean correlation with distance-weighted population in a 5 mile radius is 0.1219 (Std. deviation = 0.1993) and mean correlation with distance-weighted PCI is -0.0889 (Std. deviation = 0.1849). Thus on average, commercial zoned locations are slightly positively (negatively) correlated with distance-weighted population (distance-weighted PCI).
Hence, when zoning is omitted, the presence of retailers closer to (farther from) locations with high population (PCI) may be misattributed to a stronger (weaker) effect of population (PCI) on store profits. That is, a model that omits zoning is likely to overestimate (underestimate) the effect of population (PCI). Nevertheless, as the standard deviations indicate, there is lot of variation in the extent of correlation in different markets; this suggests that the bias at the level of each market would be different, and only accommodating actual zoning restrictions at the market level would help evaluate the correct counterfactuals.
The impact of omitted zoning on the estimates of spatial competition parameters is harder to anticipate. Omitted zoning would create a correlation between the unobservables for firms at a given location ( ifl ε ) and we should expect this omission to bias the competitive effects towards zero. However, the effect is hard to predict because it is moderated by the equilibrium level of entry. As an example if stores that might have spatially differentiated if there were no zoning are now located close to each other, we may infer that spatial competition effects are not very strong and thus have a downward bias if we omitted zoning restrictions in explaining the location choice. But if the increased spatial competition due to tight zoning causes fewer firms to enter, not accounting for zoning might cause us to infer that competition effects are too strong and that is why fewer firms entered. In this case, we might over-estimate the magnitude of competition. As the impact of spatial competition is likely to be greatest at short distances and thus likely to more impact entry, we expect that the competition effect at short distances (say, 0-1 mile) will be overestimated; while the competition effect at moderate distances (say, 1-2 miles and beyond where entry itself may not be affected) is likely to be underestimated.
Structural Model Estimates
We first discuss the results with homogeneous retailers where we do not distinguish between different grocery store formats similar to Seim (2006) , before considering the model with heterogeneous retailers that can differentiate on formats.
Homogeneous Retailers
We first discuss the results with homogeneous retailers where we do not distinguish between different grocery store formats. This case is similar to the application in Seim (2006) .
Recall that the area around each location is divided into five distance bands of 1 mile widths (0-1mi., 1-2mi, 2-3mi., 3-4mi. and 4-5mi.). For the observable market characteristics that affect store profit in a location we use population (Pop) and per capita income (PCI) of consumers in the different distance bands around the location, and the extent of commercialization (Commercialization) at the location. Table 4 Like the impact of market characteristics, the spatial competition effect between rivals also decreases dramatically with distance. This signifies the benefit of spatial differentiation. As expected, the net impact of omitted zoning is that the competition effect at moderate distances of 1-2 miles, say, is underestimated (-0.139 without zoning versus -0.221 with zoning) because the proximity of competing stores in small and concentrated retail zones is wrongly inferred to be the result of low competition at such distances. If zoning restrictions were more relaxed in our sample markets then retailers would have opted for greater spatial differentiation. In contrast, the competition effect at short distances within 0-1 mile is overestimated (-0.878 without zoning versus -0.615 with zoning). As discussed above, in markets with extremely restrictive zoning firms may locate within a mile from rivals but this is usually accompanied with a smaller number of rivals entering such markets. So when the model ignores zoning it misattributes the greater spatial differentiation in other markets to the greater number of rivals.
Finally, when we do not control for zoning, low entry into markets with more restrictive zoning is explained away by a low value for the unobserved market fixed effect (Mean value of m ξ is -7.2827 without zoning versus -6.603 with zoning).
Inter-format and Intra-format Competition
We next consider heterogeneous retailers where firms make endogenous entry, location and store format choices. We classify grocery stores into six format types (i.e., F = 6): for the cases with and without zoning, respectively. 13 We can see that the impact of the observable market characteristics is different for different store formats. For instance, Table 5 (a) shows that unlike the other formats, Supercenters are not attracted towards locations with high population rather they are more sensitive to population at farther distances of 2-4 miles, perhaps because of the high cost of operating this large format in densely populated areas and also because Supercenters are likely to draw shoppers from farther distances. Similarly, consumers' per capita income has a much greater positive impact on the store profit of Superstores than that of Supermarkets and Supercenters.
Hence, the attractiveness of locations within a market varies across store formats. A comparison of the estimates again shows that ignoring zoning overestimates the impact of population and underestimates the impact of PCI.
The spatial competition parameter estimates in Table 5 (a) reveal some interesting insights. First, in general, intra-format competition is greater than inter-format competition effects. A notable exception is that Supermarkets compete more intensely with Supercenters (competition effect at 0-1 mi. = -2.188) than with other Supermarkets (competition effect at 0-1 mi.
= -1.842). This effect is consistent with the conventional wisdom that the arrival of larger stores may have significant asymmetric impact on smaller stores. Finally, some inter-format effects are positive. This effect is consistent with the conventional wisdom that consumers may wish to shop at stores of different formats: they may shop mostly at a supercenter and then shop at a close by natural food store or limited assortment store for select products-suggesting agglomeration benefits. 14 Comparing with Table 5 (b), we again see that omission of zoning underestimates the competition effect between rivals at moderate distances of 1-4 miles. Several of the inter-format competition effects at short distances (0-1 mile) get overestimated but, interestingly, most of the intra-format competition effects and the relatively high negative inter-format competition effects are underestimated. This is understandable because when rivals choose different store formats with low inter-format competition, we are more likely to observe greater spatial differentiation accompanied with greater number of rivals under less restrictive zoning and very little spatial differentiation (i.e., locating within 0-1 mile from rivals) accompanied with Some of the inter-format competition parameters are even positive which indicates that certain store formats gain some agglomeration benefits when they locate close to a rival with a different format. For example, the Limited Assortment stores benefit from locating close to Supercenters (1.644) and Food and Drug stores (0.790). The multiplier parameters for the different distance bands again indicate that the competition effect decreases with distance from rivals.
14 An alternative explanation is unobservable to researcher location shocks (e.g., favorable road intersections or low rents) that may be observable to retailers. We thank a reviewer for suggesting this alternative explanation.
smaller number of rivals under more restrictive zoning. Hence, such inter-format competition effects get overestimated when zoning is omitted. But when firms choose similar store formats they need to defend against the high intra-format competition through spatial differentiation.
So when zoning is more restrictive in a market and even if it is accompanied with a smaller number of rivals, firms with similar formats are less likely to be found within a very short distance from each. Hence, there is less scope for overestimation of the intra-format competition effects. Similar explanation holds for the underestimation of the relatively high negative interformat competition effects.
These results suggest that more restrictive zoning may be a deterrent for entry, especially when multiple entering retailers choose the same store format. However, the low (and sometimes positive) inter-format competition implies that under more stringent spatial zoning regulations, firms could differentiate in terms of their retailing formats to reduce competition, without reducing entry much.
Counterfactual Simulations
We perform two sets of counterfactuals. First we assess how constraining the area available for retail entry through zoning affects retail entry and format variety. Second, we assess how certain prototypical zoning arrangements such as centralized zoning, neighborhood zoning and outskirt zoning impact format variety.
Effect of Zoning Restrictions on Entry and Format Variety
To investigate the impact of greater zoning restrictions on firms' entry decisions and format variety, we generate 100, 8mi. X 8mi., hypothetical markets each of which is divided into sixty-four 1 sq. mile block locations. Values for Population, PCI and commercial activity are randomly assigned to each market location. Starting with no zoning restrictions (i.e., all 64 locations in each market are available for retailers), we gradually increase zoning restrictions in these markets and explore the influence of zoning on market structure. For this, we reduce the number of locations that are available for retailers in a market in steps of one location. At each step, the new location that is 'zoned out' is randomly selected in each market so that at any step the scope for spatial differentiation varies across markets.
As we gradually increase zoning restrictions, we calculate firms' entry probability in each market and the equilibrium location and format choice probabilities. Note that given model parameter estimates, and the equilibrium number of firms that enter a market, the fixed point solution of Equation 6 will give us the equilibrium conditional location and format choice probabilities. We use the nested fixed point approach for this calculation. 15 m ξ Now, to obtain the equilibrium number of firms that enter a market, we calculate the entry probability using
Equation 7. For this, we need the unobserved market-specific components, . We fix Table 5 (a). We see that entry probabilities decrease when fewer market locations are available to retailers. Consequently, the equilibrium number of retailers that can enter these markets decreases rapidly from ten firms when all sixty-four locations are available to five firms when only sixteen locations are available; i.e., when the share of commercial zoned locations is only 25% of the market area, the number of firms fall by 50%.
We next explore how format differentiation can mitigate the entry deterring effect of zoning. For this we compare the entry probabilities for heterogeneous firms (all six store formats) with that under the assumptions of (a) partial heterogeneity where an entering firm can choose from one of three formats -Supermarket, Limited Assortment and Food and Drug, and (b) homogeneity where an entering firm can only setup a store with the Supermarket format.
Now when zoning restrictions increase in markets, the entry probabilities drop at a faster rate under partial heterogeneity as the scope for spatial differentiation as well as format differentiation are limited. The drop in entry probabilities is even faster under homogeneity. This is shown in Figure 5 (b) where we see that a greater heterogeneity on the format dimension increases the entering firms' ability to withstand greater zoning restrictions. For instance, in the case of heterogeneous firms, as we reduce the number of available market locations from 46 to 34, the average number of market entrants continues to remain fixed at 8 firms. But in the case of homogeneous firms, the number of firms dropped to 7 when the number of available locations was reduced to 39. Further, when the number of available locations falls to 8, i.e., 12.5% of the available area, the number of entrants under heterogeneity (4 entrants) is 50% more than when there is only partial heterogeneity (3 entrants) and 100% more than when there is homogeneity (2 entrants).
We next evaluate how the format mix or variety changes with greater zoning restrictions. We measure format concentration in a market through a metric that is similar to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Specifically, we use the sum of squares of shares of the six different store formats in a market to obtain the following HHI of format concentration for a given number of entering firms:
A lower value for this HHI indicates a lower concentration of any single store format in the market or a greater format variety in the market. As shown in Figure 5 (c), we find that as zoning restrictions in markets increase, for large ranges of zoning restrictions the average HHI of format concentration decreases while the number of entrants remains fixed. For instance, as the number of available locations in the 8mi. X 8mi. markets drops from 32 (50% of the market)
to 24 (37.5% of the market), the HHI of format concentration decreases from 0.2203 to 0.2193 while the number of entering firms remains unchanged at seven. Hence, firms resort to format differentiation to mitigate the entry deterrent effect of zoning. Our results demonstrate that citizens and local governments making zoning decisions to restrict the available locations for retailers will not only reduce the number of retailers available to shop, but can also impact the type of shopping formats available to the citizenry.
Prototypical Zoning Arrangements: Centralized, Neighborhood and Outskirt Zoning
We consider three prototypical zoning arrangements and how it impacts format variety:
"centralized," "neighborhood," and "outskirt" zoning. Centralized zoning seeks to mimic a zoning arrangement where commercial locations are restricted to a town center; neighborhood zoning seeks to mimic an arrangement where commercial locations are restricted to the centers of local neighborhoods, while outskirt zoning seeks to mimic a zoning arrangement where commercial locations are restricted to the periphery of the town. These arrangements differ in the extent to which firms can spatially differentiate.
As before we take 8 mi. X 8 mi. markets with sixty-four 1 sq. mile locations, but create zoning restrictions consistent with the three prototypical zoning arrangements. To control for availability of locations across the three zoning arrangements, we allow entry into only sixteen 
Conclusion
The literature on retailer entry and location choices has thus far ignored the spatial zoning regulations that impact entry and location decisions. Taking advantage of a publicly available, digital land cover database, NLCD, we are able to study the effect of zoning on entry, location and format choices. We estimate a static, structural, simultaneous move game model of entry, location and format choice with incomplete information using data on the observed choices of big-box grocery store retailers in a national sample of markets. We use recent advances in the empirical estimation literature of discrete games to address issues of multiple equilibria in the model and data as well as problems due to slow convergence of the estimation algorithm.
Our analysis leads to the following key takeaways: First, zoning reduces entry because the inability to spatially differentiate increases competition and reduces profitability and the number of firms a market can support. However, since inter-format competition is much less intense than intra-format competition, firms resort to format differentiation in equilibrium and thus mitigate the entry deterrent effect of zoning significantly. In fact, for some ranges of zoning restrictions, the number of firms that enter may be 50% more than when firms can differentiate on formats relative to when they cannot.
Second, for large ranges of zoning restrictions, which limit the ability to spatially differentiate, there may be no changes in the number of firms in the market, but only changes in the retail mix of formats. This has implications for empirical work, because one may see little changes in entry in response to zoning restrictions and thus may misinterpret the result as zoning having no impact on retailer choices, especially when retailers can differentiate on formats. We have also shown that for any given area available for retail entry, the spatial distribution of the available locations matters for the type of store formats in the market.
Specifically, centralized zoning allows for greater format variety, while outskirt zoning leads to lower format variety, with neighborhood zoning at an intermediate level of format variety. This insight on the link between zoning, spatial differentiation and format differentiation is not only important for retailers, but also for city planners who seek to encourage retail format variety in their markets through their zoning authority.
Finally, we find that ignoring spatial zoning regulations in estimating entry and location models, causes serious underestimation of the impact of market characteristics like population and income on store profit potential. It also leads to underestimation of the true intensity of spatial competition between rivals. The net effect of these biases is that retailers' willingness to enter a market and their propensity to differentiate on formats are underestimated.
We next discuss some key limitations in this paper that warrant future research. First, we abstract away from the fact that entry and location decisions have been made over time and treat entry and location decisions within a static equilibrium framework. A dynamic analysis requires better data (timing of entry and exits). The dynamic analysis becomes practically infeasible in modeling spatial differentiation at a micro-level of 1 square miles, because of the explosion in state space. However given the fineness of zoning regulations and the need to model spatial differentiation carefully, such a detailed modeling of location choices becomes critical. Second, we have treated store entry decisions across markets as independent, unlike recent work by Jia (2008) , who models the chain entry decision, taking into account the interdependence across markets. However, her modeling approach is restricted to a small number of competing chains and is hard to extend to our grocery market setting that involves a large number of players. These important issues await future research. (Notes -*: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01; All significant estimates in bold) 19 For Supercenter format, estimates corresponding to population at different distance bands are coefficients rather than distance multipliers. T T n n n n n n P P P P P P      
Step 3: Crossover and Mutation -Obtain an offspring from each couple as follows: ; ;...;
T n n n P P P     .
Iterate Steps 1-3 until the set of CCPs converges.
Appendix B
In their classification of land types, NLCD 2001 combines high density residential land and commercial land but NLCD 1992 separates them. Hence, we match the two data sets using ArcGIS software to separate the pixel data for all residential land areas from land areas with commercial activity in 2001. We are able to do this separation because land areas which were high density residential in 1992 are unlikely to convert to with commercial land areas by 2001, and vice versa. If there is a situation where an area that was low-density residential in 1992 has been classified as commercial land in the 2001 data then we do a quick visual inspection of the geographical area using Google Earth to confirm whether that area is truly commercial land or if it has converted into a high density residential land.
